

# MISSING PAGE

Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP75-00163R000200040005-8

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

ATTACHMENT MISSING

Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP75-00163R000200040005-8

SECRET

25X1

vault areas was overall inadequate, but increased in Main Vault #1 and Main Vault #2 where CIA and AEC are behind additionally constructed wire mesh barriers. However, in the time the Security representatives were present at WNRC (approximately 6 hours in 3 visits) the GSA employees gave little evidence of possessing a security consciousness. This observation also coincides with the practical working experience of 2 CIA employees who have had occasion either to visit or work at WNRC, and their comments are enclosed in this report at Tabs E and F.

(2) There is currently no system of identification at WNRC other than personal recognition, no security badging presently exists, and the security afforded WNRC at the rear loading dock during the Center's operative hours depends upon the line of sight vision and security awareness of a GSA female employee whose primary job is receipt control of incoming record shipments.

(3) Additionally, there is a glaring inconsistency in the present WNRC security system wherein the combination on the outer vault door of the 3 classified main vaults is changed periodically, but the key lock to the inner vault door is never changed. It is this inner vault door which actually prevents access to unauthorized personnel during the operative hours.

#### 14. Conclusion

(1). The overall WNRC security system under current practices would be inadequate for the storage of CIA classified records, if the 2 Agency employees are withdrawn because of the reasons cited above in paragraph 13 subparagraphs (1), (2) and (3). Summarily, the inadequacies involve:

SECRET

1. Too great a dependence upon personal recognition to prevent access to classified vault areas by unauthorized personnel.
2. Dependence upon a non-security female employee to prevent unauthorized access to the WNRC building at the rear loading dock, adjacent to the CIA vault area.
3. Failure to periodically change the key locks to the inner vault door of the 3 classified main vaults.
4. Total dependence upon non-CIA employees to protect CIA classified records -- a dependence not only involving the protective system itself, but a dependence upon personnel over whom we can exercise no control.

15. Recommendation

It is recommended that the CIA not use the WNRC for the storage of its classified material because of the security inadequacies cited in this report.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Howard J. Osborn  
Director of Security

25X1

Atts

The recommendation contained in paragraph 15 is approved.

\_\_\_\_\_  
R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date